the realization of individuality" (134). But Leiss is doubtful; he sees a place, or at least a possible place, for a suitably tamed market. He notes also that Macpherson does not show us what might be put in place of a market to serve the end of personal development. Leiss argues that we have become increasingly aware of "antagonistic elements within the system of production and consumption of utilities" (137)-of negative externalities which of course undermine the ideal working of the market-and that we are increasingly aware of how we may regulate, but not destroy, the market to overcome these externalities. Leiss' paper might be seen as expressing "revisionist Macphersonism"; one would welcome a continuing debate.
Lukes' discussion moves at a quite different level. He argues that the maximization of human powers .which Macpherson proposes to supplant the maximization of utilities as a criterion for evaluating democracy, is essentially indeterminate, since human powers can not be specified in abstraction from forms of social life. There is no fixed, given set of human capacities, whose realization would afford a single dimension along which possible societies might be measured. Rather each society determines a different set of capacities. Lukes tells us that "any fully developed democratic theory must get into the detailed business of comparing the actual and possible structures of living which are implicit in contemporary political struggle and debate" (152) .
But from what standpoint is this comparison to proceed? Unless we may assume certain absolute values-an assumption alien to Lukes' social relativism-what standard can offer us an evaluation of the lives of beings who differ, not only in opportunities but also in desires and capacities, not only in what they realize but in what they might realize? Lukes is, I think, right to find Macpherson's criterion indeterminate, but I am not convinced that with greater care, a criterion could not be developed which would be essentially individualistic but would recognize what is correct in Lukes' insistence that "social relations structure human activities and potentialities" (151).
Lukes rejects Macpherson's individualism-that is, the idea of the individual as providing, in his nature, a standard for the evaluation of society. He does not, and within the brief compass of his paper he could not, offer a positive, developed Corp, 1979. Pp. 137. $12.50 This is a short book, not only in pages.
The main line of criticism pursued by Schaefer through the five chapters, epilogue and appendix of Justice or Tyranny? is that Rawls fails to write true political philosophy. What Schaefer regards as the true nature of political philosophy, and philosophy, for that matter, is not fully elucidated, but judging from his criticisms, it appears that the true nature of philosophy is to be some form of platonic realism: discovering objective truth. That Rawls does not understand this true nature, Schaefer informs us,isevident in the title ofRawls'book. It is a theory of justice, not directly what justice is. Rawls denies the existence of an objective eidos or essence of justice; so, he cannot demonstrate political beliefs to be objectively true or false.
What Schaefer writes is correct. Rawls is not seeking the form of the Good. But this is not criticism. Schaefer has only stated that Rawls' theory is not what it is not. But Schaefer thinks more hangs on what may be called Rawls' antirealism. He even refuses to recognize that Rawls offers an alternative, a theory which is rich, complex and important. He tells us that he does not accept the proposition that "either A Theory of Justice itself or that broader approach it represents are truly deserving of the title of political philosophy" (xii). Too bad. Schaefer does not comprehend Rawls' project and as a result, his criticisms misfire.
Given the amount of writing on A Theory of Justice, it seems hardly necessary to describe what Rawls sets out to accomplish in his book, yet, to show how far astray Schaefer gets, let us traverse well covered ground. Part of Rawls' project is the use of the contractarian tradition (in accordance with the method of Rawls' moral theory) to attempt to derive principles expressive of democratic society. The social contract version Rawls uses, the original position, is a hypothetical situation set up as a method to solve the problems of social choice. In this hypothetical situation, Rawls constructs the problems of social choice as parallel to the problems of individual choice. Described as rational, mutually disinterested and possessing a sense of justice, the individuals, the people in the original position, will employ, under specified conditions, rational choice decision procedures to come up with the principles of justice.
Rawls' choice of methodology is defended by his view of moral epistemology. Rawls thinks ethics cannot be derived from intuitions or definitions; instead, it is developed by an interchange of theory and observations of particular moral judgments. The particular moral judgments, considered judgments, will exercise the sense of justice, a sense which Rawls compares to a person's syntactic competency. This is not intuitionism. Rawls is not intuiting general principles. Rather, his aim is to retain the intuitive plausibility of particular judgments when forming their underlying moral principles and that the theory as a whole should illuminate the particular judgments derivable from it. In this procedure, all manner of descriptions and arguments should be presented for one's judgment. As a result, the theory may (or may not) undergo a radical shift and achieve greater coherence. Once the interplay between theory, facts and considered judgments reach relative stability, then our judgments are described as in reflective equilibrium. This is not so unlike the circular methodology of science-observations are used to correct theory; theory, in turn, works to correct observation; scientific methodology mediates the process, but it, too, is corrected in turn. Rawls, however, does not see reflective equilibrium as giving us truth conditions: It is, at best, only an approximation eventually to be superceded by other theories.
Rawls acknowledges the possibility of there being more than one set of principles which will match considered judgments in a state of reflective equilibrium, or more than one moral theory which sets out the principles. Thus, the indefinite article in the title of Rawls' book is apposite. Rawls sees his theory as only one possible theory of justice.
In his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, Rawls explicitly states that his conception of moral theory does not assume one correct moral conception nor presuppose the existence of objective moral truths. 1 Rawls' goal is not justification, but clarification. By finding an accurate account of our moral conceptions, questions of meaning and justification may then be easier to answer. Rawls wants moral theory to provide a groundwork from which to pursue other moral philosophical aims. Just as our understanding of the meaning and justification of statements of logic and mathematics were made possible by the knowledge of fundamental structures of logic and set theory and their relation to mathematics, so, Rawls believes, can our understanding of moral philosophy be transformed by the study of our substantive moral conceptions via frameworks which will focus our moral sensibilities, put before our intuitive capacities more limited and manageable questions for judgment, and clarify and order our thoughts.
The extent to which Schaefer misperceives Rawls' theory and misdirects his criticism can be shown by a few examples.
Schaefer complains that "nowhere in his thematic treatment of the sense of justice does Rawls provide evidence or argument to demonstrate that such a sense provides men with adequately objective guidance regarding what is just" (14). As described above, the sense of justice is not intended to be used for objective guidance, but to contribute to the retention of the intuitive plausibility of general principles and moral theory. But Schaefer misconstrues the sense of justice as an all-powerful tool. He suggests Rawls has no need for a conception of justice at all. "If all men possessed an innate sense of justice that not only enabled them to make reliable judgments of justice, but actually insured that they would act justly without any governmental coercion, it is hard to understand how an injustice could have arisen in the first place" (40).
Schaefer even writes as if he does not fully recognize the original position as a hypothetical situation employed as a methodological device when he describes the four-stage sequence as absurd since "one need only imagine the response that a delegate to the 1787 convention would have elicited had he proposed it" (45).
Rawls' substantive doctrine contains many controversial elements, not the least of which is its extreme egalitarianism which is both anti-perfectionist and anti-meritocratic. Justice is measured by the extent to which social institutions counteract inequalities of birth, talent and circumstance and combine the resources for service of the individual benefits of liberty, social and economic advantages, and self-esteem. Schaefer dispatches with Rawls' anti-meritocracy by arguing "since justice necessarily entails some proportion between the goods to be distributed and the merit of persons receiving them, to deny that people 1 "The Independence of Moral Theory", Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 48 (1975) , 9.
deserve their own natures ... is to undermine any ground for distinguishing justice from injustice" (56). The' 'tyranny'' in Schaefer's title is largely directed against the third section of A Theory of Justice, part of which attempts to account for the values of society and the good of justice. Schaefer objects to Rawls' definition of good as a successful execution of a rational plan of life drawn up under favorable conditions such that the person whose plan it is is reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through. Plans which are rational to adopt Rawls sees as varying from person to person depending upon their endowments and circumstances. Rawls' definition is, Schaefer points out, entirely "subjectivistic". Schaefer thinks Rawls ought to have discovered what is good for man by nature, and justice must be conducive to or compatible with that good. Rawls' refusal to define justice by invoking a prior standard of human excellence prevents Rawls, Schaefer believes, from validating his account of justice and his discussion of social and psychological benefits of his just society. But what Schaefer finds particularly tyrannical is Rawls' not taking men's propensities and inclinations as given and then seeking how best to fulfill them. Rawls would restrict desires and aspirations by the principles of justice which specify the boundaries that men's sytems of ends respect. This restriction Schaefer regards as tantamount to tyranny since "by no means short of tyranny would anyone hope to institute a social order irrespective of its present members' desires and needs" (71). Here, again, Schaefer has not attended to the theoretical nature of Rawls' discussion. Rawls is not talking of instituting his vision here and now; rather, he is discussing how justice as fairness shapes the framework of society. Injustice as fairness, the concept of right is prior to that of good. This Rawls supposes is recognized in the original position, and it is in the original position that parties agree to conform their conceptions of their good to what the principles of justice require, or at least, not make claims which directly violate the principles. Regardless that one might take pleasure in others' deprivation, because it violates the principles agreed to in the original position, that pleasure is wrong in itself. Rawls cannot be accused of tyranny for restricting those things which are wrong.
Potentially, Schaefer could have had a critique of Rawls. He could have argued, for example, that there exists or that we need objective moral and political principles and thereby, criticize any theory which failed to recognize this. But Schaefer merely asserts that Rawls' motivation is not genuinely philosophical because he pays insufficient attention "to seeking out the truth about justice" (92). Rawls makes no mention of truth as the proper object of moral theory, so Schaefer concludes Rawls' enterprise is essentially ideology. Later, Schaefer claims that Rawls equates the substance of justice with the sum of the opinions men have about it, that "there exists no objective or natural standard against which those opinions or intuitions might be judged correct or incorrect" (94). Given the above description of Rawls' theory, this clearly misdescribes Rawls' theory of justice. Further, Schaefer thinks Rawls is wrong because our everyday understanding of what we are doing when we make political and moral judgments presupposes that there exists an independent standard of justice rooted in our perception of the nature of things. Schaefer never defends his questionable view of moral and political philosophy except to state that great philosophers from Plato to Kant viewed philosophy as he does.
But whether moral and political philosophy requires objective truths, whether truth, objective or otherwise, is even the goal of philosophy, is still an open question. Rawls cannot be criticized simply because he has decided that it does not.
Some pertinent criticisms of Rawls see print in this book, but they have all been stated previously and more perceptively elsewhere. Reading Rawls is one example. 2 Read that book instead.
